Interest in Judgments Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation by unknown
Notes
Interest in Judgments Against the
Federal Government: The Need for Full
Compensation
Sovereign immunity doctrine precludes many plaintiffs who successfully
sue the federal government from receiving interest on monetary judg-
ments.' This bar does not apply to suits brought under the taking clause
of the Fifth Amendment,2 nor does it apply to suits based upon statutes or
contracts that expressly provide for interest.' Claims for interest not fall-
ing squarely within these exceptions, however, have been rejected with
increasing rigor by the courts."
The most recent and politically important example of the rule preclud-
ing interest involves Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Under
1. See, e.g., United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951) (rejecting claim
for interest by Native American tribe attempting to recover under special act of Congress authorizing
"any and all legal and equitable claims" provided by act); United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel
Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588 (1947) (rejecting claim for interest under "just compensation" provision in
lease cancelled by Secretary of War); United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 207 (1941) (rejecting
claim for interest by private party seeking compensation for tortious acts committed by administrative
official).
Federal law provides for interest on final judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1261 (1976). Interest in final
judgments is not allowed, however, in suits against the federal government. Holly v. Chasen, No. 79-
1492, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. Jan 7, 1981) (traditional rule precluding government liability for inter-
est "makes no distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment awards").
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1950) ("The only
exception [to the traditional rule] arises when the taking entitles the claimant to just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment."); United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123-26 (1938)
(awarding interest for indemnification of Indian tribes for land taken from them by United States
under power of eminent domain); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344 (1927) (allowing inter-
est as part of compensation due to plaintiff for government's wartime appropriation of plaintiff's
wharf).
3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1976) (in any judgment against the United States for any over-
payment of internal revenue tax "interest shall be allowed at an annual rate established under section
6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 upon the amount of the overpayment, from the date of the
payment or collection thereof . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 2516(9) (1976) ("Interest in a claim against the
United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the Court of Claims only under a contract or Act of
Congress expressly providing for payment thereof.")
4. See pp. 304-06 infra.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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Title VII, prevailing plaintiffs may be awarded backpay.6 Title VII suits
proceed slowly, and it is often several years before plaintiffs receive judg-
ments.7 Especially in a period characterized by steady inflation, the time
lag between violation and judgment significantly reduces the benefit of a
backpay award unless it is augmented by interest. In Title VII suits
against private employers and state and local governments, courts have
awarded interest on backpay awards.' Prevailing judicial opinion holds,
however, that because Title VII does not expressly provide for interest,
sovereign immunity bars it in suits against the federal government.9
This Note argues that the traditional rule precluding federal govern-
ment liability for interest is outmoded. The Note traces the history of that
rule and concludes that it originally developed in response to conceptions
regarding awards of interest in private lawsuits, but that it did not keep
pace with changes in those conceptions. The Note proposes an alternative
rule that is both sensitive to these changes and to the policies and assump-
tions underlying the principle of sovereign immunity. Finally, the Note
applies the proposed rule to employment discrimination law, and con-
cludes that Title VII should be held to authorize interest liability against
the federal government.
I. The Divergence of Interest Doctrine and the Rule Precluding Gov-
ernment Liability for Interest
The traditional rule precluding government liability for interest was
based upon the conception, rooted in the English common law, that inter-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976); see Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
7. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) ("The length of litigation in complex Title VII class actions often rivals
that of even the most notorious antitrust cases.") Pettway began in 1965 with complaints to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Suit was brought in the district court in 1966. After a series
of proceedings, including appellate remands, the district court issued a final judgment, including mon-
etary relief, in 1975. The 1978 circuit court opinion remanded for further proceedings.
For examples of more typical, but still protracted, Title VII suits, see EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (six years between complaint and judgment);
EEOC v. Lithographers & Photoengravers I.U., 412 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1976) (six years between
complaint and judgment); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974),
modified, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (seven years between complaint and judgment). Interest was
awarded in all of the above cases.
8. See, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (state government);
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979) rev'd and remanded,
535 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976) (private employer); Howard v. Ward City, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D.
1976) (municipal government). But see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 366 (S.D.
Ind. 1967), modified, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (interest denied based upon court's view of "gen-
eral equities" of case).
9. See, e.g., Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980); deWeever v. United States, 618
F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1980); Saunders v. Claytor, No. 79-4373, slip. op. at 4-6 (9th Cir. Oct. 3,
1980); Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406, 411 (1st Cir. 1978); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 925
(3d Cir. 1977).
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est was a penalty. The present trend, however, is to view interest not as a
penalty but as compensation for the lost use-value of money. 0 This
change in the meaning of interest has eroded the basis for the rule barring
interest awards against the federal government.
A. The Evolution of Interest Doctrine
Interest doctrine has been characterized by the steady erosion of restric-
tive categories that have tended to discourage awards of interest." Interest
was once conceived of solely as a fee for lending money." It was viewed
with distaste by Greek philosophers"5 and condemned as usury in Judeo-
Christian religious belief.' 4 The English common law reflected this repug-
nance by prohibiting interest charges on loans.'" As the commercial needs
and political power of business enterprise became more important, how-
ever, the law gradually came to view interest more tolerantly. 6 Legal doc-
trine was manipulated to enlarge the category of situations in which inter-
est could properly be awarded.' 7 Interest came to be viewed as a penalty
for damages incurred as a result of a debtor's failure to pay back his loan
I0. In the context of claims for compensation, interest represents the difference in the value of a
certain sum of money at one time and the increased value of that sum at a later time. Interest is
required in order to compensate an individual for having forgone a certain sum at an earlier time.
The central fact underlying the economic theory of interest is that money itself represents a scarce
good that can be put to profitable use. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMIcS 200-03
(2d ed. 1967).
11. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5, at 174 ("Courts have moved steadily toward more
liberal grants of interest. . . ."); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 51, at 206-11 (1935) (award
of interest as damages has grown more prevalent, beginning as allowance discretionary with jury but
gradually becoming an element of compensation claimable as matter of right); 1 T. SEDGWICK, MEA-
SURE OF DAMAGES § 297, at 567-68 (9th ed. 1912) ("The gradual extension of the principles allowing
interest as damages is clear.") For a sprightly account of the early development of interest doctrine,
see Marshall v. Beeler, 104 Kan. 32, 34-37, 178 P. 245, 246-47 (1919).
12. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51, at 207.
13. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 29 (E. Barker trans. 1946) ("[Of all modes of acquisition, usury is the
most unnatural.")
14. Exodus 22:25 ("[I1f thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shall not
be to him a usurer, neither shall thou lay upon him usury.") Usury has come to mean excessive
interest. In the Old Testament, however, usury denoted any charge for the use of money. See T.
DIVING, INTEREST: AN HISTORICAL & ANALYTIC STUDY IN ECONOMICS & MODERN ETHICS 4 (1958)
("Only after the repeal of the prohibitions of interest . . . and the establishment of a legal rate, did
'usury' receive its present meaning of an exorbitant charge for a money loan or a charge that exceeds
the legal rate.")
15. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100 (2d ed. 1926).
16. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51, at 207. ("In the face of . . . economic demand,
church and state were powerless to prevent the commercial borrower from bargaining for money that
he needed and could only get by offering an inducement in return."); cf Marshall v. Beeler, 104 Kan.
32, 36, 178 P. 245, 247 (1919) ("[T]he Fathers of the Church, realizing that the struggling commerce
of the times, as well as the natural laws of trade, demanded the extension of the credit system, and the
employment of capital, and that interest was gradually becoming a virtual necessity, advanced the
peculiar doctrine that Jews might be allowed to take interest, since they were to be damned in any
case, and by giving them the monopoly of the business, the souls of Christians might not be lost.")
17. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51, at 207.
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on the date specified in the contract. Thus, a fee for merely lending money
was considered usurious. But, if the loan was not repaid promptly accord-
ing to the terms of a contract, a fee for delay was considered appropriate. 8
This characterization of interest as a fault-based penalty for delayed
payment also influenced the development of legal doctrine regulating the
award of non-contractual interest as an element of damages in lawsuits.'9
This influence has manifested itself in a number of ways. Some jurisdic-
tions have provided that interest serve as an explicitly punitive measure in
cases in which the defendant's conduct is willfully or egregiously im-
proper.20 In many jurisdictions, the determination of interest liability was
consigned to the discretion of juries.2 ' Because interest was seen as some-
thing distinct from compensation, rather than as an element of compensa-
tion owed to plaintiffs as a matter of right, it was separated from the
principal award and made a gratuity whose award was influenced more
by a defendant's conduct than by a plaintiff's condition.22 Further under-
lining the centrality of fault in interest doctrine was the rule that a court
18. See Note, Prejudgment Interest as an Element of Damages: New Application of an Old The-
ory, 15 STAN. L. REV. 107, 107 (1962) (early cases awarding interest did so "seemingly on the theory
that defendant should be penalized for not paying promptly the amount owed"); Comment, Prejudg-
ment Interest: An Element Not To Be Overlooked, 8 CUM. L. REV. 521, 522 (1977) (under tradi-
tional theory "prejudgment interest is a penalty against the breaching party due to his failure to pay
immediately the fixed damages") [hereinafter cited as Prejudgment Interest]; Comment, Interest As
Damages in California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 262, 263 (1958) (punishment of defendant implicit objec-
tive of interest awards under traditional principles of interest doctrine). Cf Township of Wayne v.
Ricmin, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 509, 308 A.2d 27 (1973) (traditionally interest is in the nature of a
penalty); Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 179, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (1899) ("[A] refusal to pay money
legally due, like a refusal to perform any other legal duty to another, merited condemnation and
punishment from the courts, and the doctrine of interest as damages, in absence of express agreement,
became established; but it was allowed as damages and by way of punishment to a wrongdoer.")
19. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51, at 210.
20. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3288 (West 1970) (originally enacted in 1872) ("In an action for
the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice,
interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-05 (Supp. 1979)
(originally enacted in 1877) (interest may be given at discretion of court and jury); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 74, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (originally enacted in 1845) (interest may be awarded "on money
withheld by an unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment"). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 11, § 57a (interest award, except when pursuant to contract, must be based upon unjustifiable
withholding of money due as debt or money recoverable as damages); 1 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF
DAMAGES § 294 (9th ed. 1912) ("Many states by statute allow interest when money is vexatiously
withheld."); T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 402 (1st ed. 1847) (interest allowable in cases
involving unliquidated damages only "if the conduct of the defendant was improper, i.e., where fraud
or gross misconduct could be imputed to him"); I J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES § 323 (4th ed.
1912) (interest generally allowable in cases in which payment is unreasonably and vexatiously
delayed).
21. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51, at 206 ("[T]he practice of giving interest as damages
. . . comes in first as allowance discretionary with the jury and only gradually finds its place as an
element of compensation which can be claimed as a matter of right."); I T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF
DAMAGE.S § 297 (9th ed. 1912) ("[T]he law first gave discretion to the jury to give interest as dam-
ages, and then allowed it as a matter of law in a constantly increasing number of cases.")
22. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 57a (interest awards, except when pursuant to contract,
must be based upon unjustifiable withholding of money due as debt or recoverable as damages).
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should disallow interest awards if a defendant could not be blamed for
delay in payment.23
The most prominent feature of the penalty theory of interest was its
distinction between liquidated and unliquidated damages. Courts usually
refused to award interest on a claim unless it was liquidated.2 ' A classic
liquidated claim is one in which the measure of injury is a fixed sum
payable on a specified date.2 The requirement that a claim be for liqui-
dated damages stemmed from the courts' insistence upon assessing
whether a defendant was at fault in delaying payment of debt or dam-
21ages. 6 If a claim was unliquidated a defendant could not reasonably be
expected to know how much to pay a plaintiff in order to avoid incurring
interest. Because a defendant could not be expected to pay an obligation of
uncertain magnitude, it was thought improper to penalize him for with-
holding payment pending adjudication.2 1
Courts in the United States in the early nineteenth century strictly in-
terpreted the liquidated-unliquidated distinction; in order for a court to
award prejudgment interest the amount of damages had to be uncontested
or of a definite fixed amount.28 Courts soon recognized, however, that
stringent application of the liquidated damages requirement would se-
23. 1 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 340 (9th ed. 1912) (interest for delay not chargea-
ble if payment is forbidden by law or impeded by legal proceedings); W. HALE, LAW OF DAMAGES §
72 (2d ed. 1912) ("[Wlhere the defendant is not responsible for the delay in making compensation, he
is not chargeable with interest.")
24. T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 395 (1st ed. 1847). ("It is also a general rule, that
interest is not recoverable on unliquidated demands.")
25. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 54 (claim is liquidated if amount that satisfies it can be
computed exactly without reliance upon opinion or discretion). For an example of liquidated damages,
see Aurora City v. West, 74 U.S. 82, 105 (1868) (allowing interest payment on failure to pay fixed
sum at fixed time as required by contract).
For examples of damages traditionally viewed as unliquidated, see Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Williams,
219 Ala. 238, 121 So. 722 (1929) (no interest allowed in wrongful death action); Farrelly v. Heuack-
er, 118 Fla. 342, 159 So. 24 (1935) (interest precluded in actions for personal injuries). See also C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 57 (interest not allowed for claim based upon pain, humiliation or
similar damages for which there is no standard of measurement available).
26. See Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 179, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (1899) ("The allowance of
interest as damages was . . . confined to strictly liquidated demands. Being punishment, it should not
be imposed if there were any uncertainty as to defendant's duty to excuse nonperformance of it.");
Comment, Interest As Damages In California, supra note 18, at 262-63 (rule requiring liquidated
damages suggests that primary concern of courts has not been compensation for plaintiff but either
punishment of defendant for his fault in failing to pay definite obligation or protection of defendant
from liability for withholding payment of uncertain amount); Note, supra note 18, at 107-08 (1962)
(liquidated claim allowed on theory that defendant should be penalized for not promptly paying
amount owed).
27. See Developments in the Law-Damages, 61 HARv. L. REV. 113, 137 (1947) (rationale for
not awarding interest on unliquidated claims was that defendant "has no means available for deter-
mining the extent of his obligations and so should not be penalized for failure to make prompt pay-
ment"); Smedley, Interest as Damages in Virginia, 28 VA. L. REV. 1138, 1143 (1942) ("[Tlhe ele-
ment of fairness to the defendant, not that of the need of the plaintiff, may lead to the refusal to allow
interest on verdicts in non-liquidated damages claims.")
28. See T. SEDGWICK, supra note 24, at 394-96 (1st ed. 1847).
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verely curtail the incidence of allowable interest awards because the exact
amount owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is seldom completely certain.'
As concern for the full compensation of plaintiffs began to supersede con-
cern with defendant's fault, courts moderated the liquidated damages re-
quirement. Courts have regularly held, for instance, that a claim for inter-
est need not be liquidated in the classic sense but need only be of such a
nature that its value can be ascertained by reference to generally recog-
nized standards." Moreover, a development strongly backed by commen-
tators3 is to award interest on damages as a matter of right in practically
all cases.3 2 By awarding interest as a matter of right, courts recognize that
it is an integral component of the relief sought in the principal claim for
compensation.
B. The Rule Precluding Government Liability for Interest
The rule precluding interest awards against the federal government in
the absence of contractual or statutory authorization is based upon sover-
eign immunity doctrine and the conception of interest as a penalty. Sover-
eign immunity bars suit against the government without government con-
sent.3 Because interest was originally viewed as a penalty, distinct from
29. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51. One leading commentator suggested that American
courts "practically obliterate[d]" the liquidated-unliquidated distinction. HALE, supra note 23, at 241.
This characterization, however, goes too far. The liquidated-unliquidated distinction, interpreted with
varying degrees of strictness, is still recognized by most states. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287(a)
(West 1979) (interest awarded on damages that are certain or capable of being made certain by
calculation); OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(1)(a) (1968) (same); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 21-1-11 (1967)
(same). The liquidated-unliquidated distinction is also applied by federal courts looking to state law
in diversity cases. See, e.g., Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir.
1979) (interest denied on claim for unliquidated damages, applying Wisconsin law); Mann & Parker
Lumber Co. v. We Dri, 579 F.2d 973, 980 (6th Cir. 1978) (interest denied on claim for unliquidated
damages, applying Tennessee law). The liquidated-unliquidated distinction is also recognized by fed-
eral common law. Barrios v. Louisiana Construction Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir.
1972) (interest denied on claim for pain and suffering).
30. See D. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 3.5, at 166-168; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 51, at 210,
§§ 54-56, at 213-15; 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra note 23, §§ 299-300 (9th ed. 1912).
31. See, e.g., I T. SEDGWICK, supra note 23, § 300, at 571 ("[O]nce admit that interest is the
natural fruit of money, it would seem that wherever a verdict liquidates a claim and fixes it as of a
prior date, interest should follow from that date."); Note, supra note 18, at 109 ("ITIhe inherent
income-producing ability of money cannot be separated from the money itsElf.. . [D]enial of interest
would be denial of an inexorable economic fact.")
32. The tendency is strongest in cases involving contracts, see D. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 3.5, at
167 ("There is a strong tendency to treat any contract claim as one that is ascertainable."); and cases
involving torts against property, see Prejudgment Interest, supra note 18, at 530-34 (prejudgment
interest allowed as matter of right in majority of jurisdictions). The courts have been slower to extend
automatic awards of interest on damages in cases regarding personal injury or wrongful death. Id. at
535. Even in such cases, however, courts have begun to allow interest awards, sometimes as a matter
of jury discretion and in others as a matter of law. Id. at 535-36. For a particularly illuminating
example of a court's animus against archaic doctrine restricting interest awards see Moore-McCor-
mack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 592-95 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989
(1962) (interest awarded under Death on High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976)).
33. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
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substantive claims for compensation, it was barred unless the government
consented not only to liability for the underlying substantive claim but
also to liability for the additional wrong addressed by an award of inter-
est. 4 The central controversy in cases involving claims for interest against
the government has focused upon whether particular statutory waivers of
immunity embraced interest liability.3
1. Evolution of the Doctrine Precluding Government Liability for
Interest
During the nineteenth century, administrative officials sometimes inter-
preted statutes liberally so as to allow interest awards against the govern-
ment. 6 The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. McKee, handed
204 (1882); Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 345 (1879).
Sovereign immunity doctrine has periodically been criticized by judges, especially in the state
courts. See, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458-59 (1961). Academic commen-
tators have been particularly harsh in their criticism of the doctrine. Some commentators argue for
legislative abolition or reform of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liabilty in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962); Crampton,
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign
Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, And Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387 (1970). Other
commentators argue for judicial reform of the doctrine. See, e.g., Block, Suits Against Government
Ofices and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1079-86 (1946); Davis, Sover-
eign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other than Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3, 38
(1954).
34. See United States v. Sherman, 98 U.S. 565, 567-68 (1878) ("[Wjhenever interest is allowed
either by statute or by common law . . . it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. But delay or
default cannot be attributed to the government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it
owes.") See also 5 Op Att'y Gen. 138 (1849) ("It is certainly true that, as a refusal or delay of a
debtor sovereign to pay a debt is never to be presumed, interest as a general rule is not to be ex-
acted."); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 463 (1831) (unlikely that award for interest against government would ever
be appropriate since government, always ready to pay just claim immediately, is never at fault for
delay); see I Op. Att'y Gen. 268 (1819) (interest on settlement not allowed because government not at
fault for delay in payment of settlement to plaintiff). United States v. McKee, 91 U.S. 442 (1875)
implies that executive departments may have allowed interest on liquidated and undisputed claims: "It
has been the general rule of the officers of government, in adjusting and allowing unliquidated and
disputed claims against the United States, to refuse to give interest." Id. at 450. If true, this practice
would tend to contradict the idea that the government was presumed always ready to pay its obliga-
tions immediately. Nevertheless, McKee shares with earlier authorities a reliance upon the concept,
implicit in the liquidated-unliquidated distinction, of interest as penalty.
35. See, e.g., 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 286, 292-94 (1843) (if provision of interest omitted from statute,
claim for interest cannot be awarded regardless of equities involved); 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 635, 638-39
(1841) (interest denied because statute did not expressly provide for it); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 390-91
(1830) (since Congress did not specifically provide for interest in act awarding "full pay" to officer,
interest cannot be allowed). See cases cited in note 9 supra.
36. See, e.g., 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 227 (1850) (allowing interest on debt owed by the government
since interest was paid previously in analogous circumstances); 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1849) (interest
allowed on claim based upon statute awarding "fair and full indemnity"); 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 216, 224-
26 (1837) (statute authorizing payment of "actual loss" stemming from unlawful seizure of claimant's
vessel construed to include interest); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 722 (1825) (construing statute authorizing
payment of interest on loans taken out by states during war as authorizing payment of interest on
loans taken out by states after war as well). But see 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 523 (1855) (attempting to limit
reach of earlier decisions granting interest awards against the government).
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down in 1875, reflected this relatively liberal attitude." In McKee the
Court allowed an interest award against the government based upon a
special act of Congress that provided that the Court of Claims should
determine the petitioner's 'claim in a manner "adopted by the United
States in the settlement of like cases."" Because the Congress, in like
cases, had specifically awarded interest, the Court interpreted the special
act in controversy to allow an award for interest.
After McKee, however, the Supreme Court became increasingly reflex-
ive and rigid in its enforcement of the traditional rule." Boston Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States,0 decided by the Supreme Court in 1928,
significantly advanced the trend toward increased strictness. The case
arose from a collision between plaintiffs steamer and a United States na-
val vessel. Plaintiff sought damages and interest based upon a special
act,4 ' which provided that damages should be determined "upon the same
principle and measure of liability with costs" as in admiralty cases be-
tween private parties." Plaintiffs argument was that, because interest was
routinely awarded in collision cases involving private parties, 43 interest lia-
bility should be assessed against the government. The Court, however,
ruled against the plaintiff. Justice Holmes asserted that Congress had
"spoken with careful precision," and insisted that the Court could allow
only those remedies specifically authorized. Since Boston Sand, the
Court has consistently applied the strictest scrutiny to claims for interest
against the government; with few exceptions, 4 only express authorization
37. 91 U.S. 442 (1875).
38. Id. at 450.
39. See, e.g., Tillson v. United States, 100 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1879). The court acknowledged that
"it was the wish of those who procured the passage of the special statute under which the Court of
Claims took jurisdiction of this suit, to obtain from Congress authority for that court to give a judg-
ment against the United States at least for interest ...." Id. at 46. But because Congress did not
grant such authority in express terms, the Court concluded that Congress "did not intend to give any
such power." Id. The Court did, however, evince some concern for maintaining a flexible standard by
which to assess waivers of immunity. It suggested, for example, that interest may have been awarded
had the statute provided that the claim be adjudicated upon principles applicable to suits between
citizens. Id.
40. 278 U.S. 41 (1928). The Court decided Boston Sand in order io settle a conflict between
circuits. Compare Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 19 F.2d 744-45 (1st Cir. 1927) (inter-
est denied because statute did not expressly provide for interest) with New York & Cuba Mail S.S.
Co. v. United States, 16 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1927) (interest allowed on statute providing that suit
be adjudicated according to principles used in settling like cases in admiralty between private parties).
41. Act of May 15, 1922, ch. 192, 42 Stat. 1590 (1922).
42. Id.
43. Boston Sand was a case in admiralty, an area of the law in which interest was traditionally
given as a part of full compensation. 278 U.S. 41. The Boston Sand Court, however, ignored the
traditional rule awarding interest in admiralty.
44. Id. at 48-49.
45. See p. 306 infra.
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on the face of the relevant legislation or contract has met the Court's
standard.46
Also supportive of the courts' reluctance to award interest on claims
against the government is legislation, first passed in 1863, governing ac-
tions in the Court of Claims.47 This legislation codified the traditional rule
forbidding awards of interest in the absence of express statutory authori-
zation.4" Supreme Court decisions involving interest awards arising from
the Court of Claims strongly affirmed the appropriateness of strictly con-
struing waivers of immunity."' These decisions, however, did not address
the general appropriateness of strict construction but only the legislative
mandate that the Court of Claims strictly construe waivers. The distinc-
tion between the Court of Claims and other courts was lost when these
decisions were used as authority to buttress the trend toward a stricter
interpretation of claims for interest in all contexts.50 As a result, judicial
opinion regarding standards for awarding interest in claims against the
government became insulated from judicial opinion regarding standards
for awarding interest in other situations. Courts became increasingly less
sensitive to the underlying theory, rooted in traditional conceptions of in-
terest, that originally justified precluding interest awards in cases against
the government. They applied the rule precluding interest liability against
46. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947) ("[There can
be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. . .. The consent necessary to waive
the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed."); United States v. Sher-
wood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941) ("Consent, since it is a relinquishment of a sovereign immunity, must
be strictly interpreted."); United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1941) (interest denied in
claim based on statute requiring payment of "just compensation" to plaintiff injured by government's
wrongful taking of his property).
47. Court of Claims Act, ch. 92, § 7, 12 Stat. 765 (1863) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a)
(1976)) ("Interest on a claim against the United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the Court of
Claims only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly providing for payment thereof.")
48. United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588 (1947) (statute governing
interest awards in the Court of Claims "embodies the traditional rule that interest cannot be recovered
against the United States upon unpaid accounts or claims in the absence of an express provision to the
contrary in a relevant statute or contract").
49. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., Inc., 329 U.S. 654 (1947); United
States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947). In Thayer-West Point Hotel, the Court
of Claims allowed interest on a claim founded upon a law that created a lease providing for "just
compensation" in the event the government cancelled the lease. The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Claims, the law governing the Court of Claims instructed it not to award interest in the
absence of express authorization. The Court's holding, then, focused upon the rules governing the
Court of Claims, not the general appropriateness of the standards governing claims for interest.
50. See, Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599 (1947). In Albrecht, the Supreme Court denied
interest to a plaintiff who initiated suit against the United States in district court. All of the decisions
cited by the Court to support the denial of interest involved suits initiated in the Court of Claims. Id.
at 605. Courts invoking the traditional rule precluding government liability for interest commonly
refer to cases that arose in the Court of Claims without questioning whether the particular laws
governing the Court of Claims can properly be applied to other contexts. See, e.g., Fischer v. Adams,
572 F.2d 406, 411 (1st Cir. 1978); Fitzgerald v. United States, 578 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978); Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1963).
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the federal government, but ignored or forgot the underlying policy the
rule was supposed to serve.
2. Exceptions to the Rule Precluding Government Liability for Interest
The Court has developed exceptions to the traditional rule barring gov-
ernment liability for interest in order to accommodate the problems pro-
duced by the divergence between that rule and the modern conception of
interest." The major class of exceptions involves claims for interest
founded upon the Fifth Amendment right to "just compensation" 2 for
private property taken by the government for public use. 3 According to
the Court, a plaintiff whose claim is based upon the Fifth Amendment is
entitled to any remedy needed to effect "just compensation," '54 including
interest. By authorizing interest on claims based upon the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Court acknowledged that interest constitutes a basic aspect of
compensation that is inseparably linked to underlying principal claims. 5
Nevertheless, the Court has not overturned the traditional rule barring
government liability for interest.
51. Interest has been allowed against the federal government when it places itself in the position
of a private party. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U.S. 76 (1925); Bituminous
Casualty Corp. v. Lynn, 503 F.2d 636, 643-46 (6th Cir. 1974). Interest is allowed against the govern-
ment in cases in which the government voluntarily brings itself within the jurisdiction of the court by
intervening in a suit between private parties. See, e.g., United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328
(1924); United States v. P & D Coal Mining Co., 251 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Ky. 1964). Interest is
also allowed in suits against certain subsidiary agencies of the federal government. See, e.g., National
Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U.S. 494 (1913); Kennedy Elec. Co. v. United
States Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1974); Gilbert v. Johnson, 490 F.2d 827, 830 (5th
Cir. 1974).
Another exception to the traditional rule allows interest to be awarded against the federal govern-
ment in suits based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1498, a statute that provides "reasonable and entire" compensa-
tion to persons whose patents are infringed by the United States. See, e.g., Waite v. United States, 282
U.S. 508 (1930); Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1972). These exceptions are
of limited applicability; none have given rise to a large class of cases. Cf United States v. Alcea Band
of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951) ("[Tlhe only exception [to the traditional rule] arises when the
taking entitles the claimant to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.")
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.")
53. See, e.g, United States v. Klamath Indians, 394 U.S. 119, 123-26 (1938) (awarding interest
on indemnification of Indian tribes for land taken by United States under power of eminent domain);
Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344 (1927) (allowing interest as part of compensation due
plaintiff for government's appropriation of plaintiff's wharf during wartime); Liggett & Myers v.
United States, 274 U.S. 215 (1927) (because order for product constituted requisition of property for
public use rather than mere contract, interest allowed on plaintiff's claim for full compensation).
54. United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 163 (1920).
55. See, Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1922) (just compensation
in Fifth Amendment context encompasses "the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken . ...
It rests on equitable principles, and it means substantially that the owner shall be put in as good
position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not been taken.")
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II. A Modern View of Government Liability for Interest
Comparing the history of interest doctrine with the evolution of the rule
precluding government liability for interest reveals two contradictory
trends. On the one hand, there has been a steady movement by courts to
broaden restrictive legal categories and to emphasize the role of interest in
rendering full compensation to plaintiffs. On the other hand, the rule pre-
cluding awards of interest against the federal government has been con-
strued with increasing strictness.
During much of the nineteenth century, a measure of congruence ex-
isted between these two trends based upon a consistent view of the mean-
ing of interest. In that period it made sense to construe waivers of immu-
nity strictly. Because interest represented a separate remedy for an
additional injury, it was reasonable to demand a clear indication from the
legislature that it intended to waive immunity not only to the principal
claim but also to a claim for interest. The modern trend, however, is to
view interest as a constituent rather than as an additional element of
compensation.
Nor does the traditional rule precluding interest awards against the
government serve the policies underlying sovereign immunity doctrine.
The central modern justification for barring suit against the government
in the absence of its consent is to prevent undue interference with the
government's public tasks. 6 That concern, however, cannot convincingly
be advanced as a reason for barring claims for interest, because by al-
lowing a suit for the principal, the government has waived its immunity
with regard to the relevant sphere of activity." Moreover, an award of
56. Several other justifications have been advanced in support of sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (sovereign immunity based on "logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the law depends"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (A. Hamilton) ("It is inherent in the nature of sover-
eignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.") See generally P. Bator, P.
Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER], at 1339-51. These explana-
tions are, however, no longer considered credible. "The only rationale for the doctrine that is now
regarded as respectable by courts and commentators alike is that official actions of the Government
must be protected from undue judicial interference." Crampton, supra note 33, at 397. See Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949) ("The interference of the Courts
with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be
protective of nothing but mischief.. . ."); Block, supra note 33, at 1061 (the only explanation "that
seems worthy of consideration as a real policy basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity today ...
is [the possibility] that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might
constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over
their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property.")
57. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 56, at 1349 (when the United States has agreed that
justice be done in the main matter, there is no reason for assuming an intention to deny the usual
incidents of justice).
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interest does not interfere with any distinct government activity, but
merely insures that a sum of money shall retain its effective value.
Analysis of some of the other justifications that have been articulated in
support of sovereign immunity leads to similar conclusions. For instance,
the old notion that "the King can do no wrong""8 led to the principle,
cited in favor of the traditional rule precluding government liability for
interest, that "delay or default cannot be attributed to the government."59
This principle is no longer applicable, because now interest is not viewed
as a penalty for delay, but rather as an integral aspect of compensation."
When courts hold, then, that claims for interest can be allowed only if
supported by a specific provision in the relevant contract or statute, they
are applying an anachronistic conception of interest.
A. The Proposed Rule
An alternative to the rule precluding government liability for interest
must take into account the following considerations in interpreting waivers
of sovereign immunity. First, an alternative rule should accord great def-
erence to specific statutory language and legislative history. Such defer-
ence is required in order to accommodate Congress' interest in controlling
government liability. If a statute specifically bars6 or consents6" to govern-
ment liability for interest, or if a statute's legislative history clearly indi-
cates a congressional preference, then a court's inquiry should be at an
end.63
Second, if the statutory language and legislative history are silent or
ambiguous as to interest, the court should look to general interest doctrine
as developed in analogous cases in private law. If plaintiffs in a private
law context receive interest on claims based upon a particular statute,
plaintiffs suing the federal government under that same statute should
also receive interest. On the other hand, if plaintiffs are barred from re-
58. See Borchard, supra note 33, at 4. The notion of royal prerogative, which originally justified
sovereign immunity in England, id., never took root in sovereign immunity doctrine in the United
States, but was transmuted into a tenet of public policy that a sovereign nation should not be com-
pelled by courts of its own creation to defend itself from attack in those courts. Id. at 5. See Langford
v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 342-343 (1878) (British maxim that King can do no wrong not
applicable to United States government).
59. United States v. Sherman, 98 U.S. 565, 568 (1879).
60. See pp. 299-303 supra.
61. See, e.g., Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) ("[N]o interest shall be allowed on any
claim up to the time of rendition of judgment unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the
payment of interest.")
62. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1976) (in any judgment against United States for any over-
payment of internal-revenue tax, "interest shall be allowed at an annual rate established under section
6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 upon the amount of the overpayment, from the date of the
payment or collection thereof").
63. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1928) (discussing statute
in which provision for interest was eliminated during legislative process).
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ceiving interest in a private law context, they should also be barred from
receiving interest in analogous litigation against the federal government. 4
If there is no private law counterpart to a particular right of action
against the federal government, courts should look for guidance to general
federal law practice."'
Third, when courts refer to private law to decide whether interest
should be awarded in suits against the federal government, they must de-
termine whether an interest award in the private law context would con-
stitute a penalty.6 Interest awards that are intended to be penalties should
not be allowed in suits against the federal government unless Congress has
consented to this form of liability. Consent in this situation is required
because the theory underlying both the modern trend in interest doctrine
and the proposed rule for determining government liability for interest is
founded upon the idea of interest as an element of compensation.
B. The Proposed Rule Applied to Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 6 established for the first time
a comprehensive law prohibiting employment practices that discriminate
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. Initially, the federal
64. This situation might arise, for example, if a federal law provided that interest be determined
according to the requirements of state law, see, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1976), and the applicable state law awarded interest only upon liquidated or ascertainable damages.
65. This situation would arise, for example, under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1976),
which empowers employees to sue various government agencies and the government of the District of
Columbia for backpay in the event of an unjustified personnel action. Because the Back Pay Act is
applicable only to certain government entities, it has not spawned cases within a purely private-law
context.
Applying the second step of the proposed rule, a court would look to general federal law practice to
determine whether plaintiffs suing under the Back Pay Act should receive interest on an award
against the federal government. This is precisely what courts do now in deciding whether to allow
interest under the Back Pay Act in suits against agencies accorded the power to sue and be sued. See,
Payne v. Panama Canal Co., 607 F.2d 155, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1979) (interest awarded). Presently,
interest is barred in suits under the Back Pay Act that are brought against the United States. See Van
Winkle v. McLucas, 537 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir. 1976).
66. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 1961) (in
diversity suit applying Illinois law, interest assessed against defendant for "unreasonable and vexa-
tious" refusal to pay). See also Rivera v. Redeberi A/B Nordstjernan, 456 F.2d 970, 975-76 (1st Cir.
1972). In Rivera, the district court awarded interest in a tort action relying upon the Puerto Rican
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The Court of Appeals held that reliance upon the Puerto Rican Rule
was misplaced, but allowed the interest award to stand. Id. at 976. Whether the interest award was
allowed in order to compensate the plaintiff fully or to punish the defendant is not made clear. That
the penalty-based conception of interest played at least a significant part in the interest award can be
inferred from the importance the court attached to the defendant's "obstinate" handling of the case,
and from the court's imposition of attorney's fees against the defendant. Id. at 975-76.
67. See pp. 299-302 supra.
68. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-16 (1976)).
69. On the historical significance of Title VII, see A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE
LAW 57-58 (1971); Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforce-
ment and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS L.J. 225, 226-31 (1976).
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government and state and local governments were exempt from Title
VII.7" In 1972, however, Congress amended Title VII to extend its pro-
tections to employees in Federal, state and local governments."
Applying the proposed rule to Title VII, as amended, the first inquiry
is whether Congress clearly indicated a preference regarding the award of
interest in either legislative history or statutory language. The legislative
history of the amendments indicates that Congress generally intended to
extend to federal employees the remedies enjoyed by employees in the pri-
vate sector. 2 One of the reasons Congress cited for amending Title VII
was that federal employees, unlike those in the private sector, faced the
legal obstacle of sovereign immunity in obtaining remedies against dis-
crimination. 3 The amendments incorporate by reference the sections of
Title VII originally governing suits against private employers. 4 On the
other hand, interest is neither expressly provided for in the text of Title
VII nor specifically mentioned in its legislative history.7" This ambiguous
silence precludes a finding that Congress expressed a clearly defined pref-
erence regarding government liability for interest.7 '
70. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253-54 (1964)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-16 (1976)).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
72. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1971) ("[Aggrieved [federal] employees as
applicants will . . . have the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the
private sector under Title VII.")
73. See S. REP. NO. 415 supra note 72, at 16 (under then-existing state of law, "[i]n many cases,
the employee must overcome a United States Government defense of sovereign immunity"); H.R.
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2160 ("There
is serious doubt that court review is available to the aggrieved Federal employee. Monetary restitution
or back pay is not attainable.")
74. The current version of the provision, provides that "[t]he provisions of section 2000e-5(f)
through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(d) (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) in turn provides that, upon a finding of unlawful
employment discrimination in the private sector or in state or local governments, a court "may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to . . . back pay . . . or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
Supreme Court interpretations of the 1972 amendments confirm the view that they were intended
to confer upon federal employees the same substantive rights enjoyed by private-sector employees. In
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) the Court held that federal employees were entitled to
trials de novo in court after going through the prerequisite administrative proceedings. The right had
been well established for private-sector employees but was not expressly authorized in the 1972
amendments providing federal employees with a cause of action. The Court emphasized that a "prin-
cipal goal" of the amendments was to accord "[alggrieved [federal] employees or applicants the full
rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under Title VII." Id.
at 841.
75. See Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The legislative history is wholly
silent on the propriety of awarding interest in Title VII cases.")
76. Although certain court decisions are cited or discussed in the legislative history of Title VII,
none involves awards for interest. See H.R. REP. NO. 238, supra note 73. Congressional silence,
however, provides no definite indication of Congressional intent. Moreover, "the political economy of
congressional attention" dictates that "low visibility" items such as liability for interest will increas-
ingly be unnoticed and undebated by Congress. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal:
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It is necessary, then, to apply the second step of the proposed test
whereby courts look to general interest doctrine as developed in analagous
cases in private law. Under this standard, interest should be awarded
against the federal government because courts have commonly allowed in-
terest in backpay awards in Title VII suits against private employers."
Applying the third step of the proposed rule buttresses this conclusion.
According to this third inquiry, courts should determine the function of
interest. Under Title VII interest serves not as a penalty but as an ele-
ment of compensation. Its compensatory character derives from the pur-
pose of backpay awards, which were intended to help effectuate the Title
VII goal of achieving equality of employment opportunities and removing
barriers that favor one identified group of employees over other employ-
ees." Backpay awards promote this purpose in two respects. First, they
provide "the spur or catalyst" that causes employers to eliminate discrimi-
natory practices."9 Second, they make persons whole for injuries suffered
from unlawful employment discrimination. 0 Courts have acknowledged
that including interest with backpay increases the incentive to eliminate
discriminatory employment practices.8 " Courts have also acknowledged
that without interest as compensation for depreciation or the forgone use-
value of wrongfully delayed wages, plaintiffs cannot be made whole
financially. Although courts rarely have explained interest awards explic-
itly in terms of a compensation theory, what mention there is of their
purposes consistently points to compensation.12 Under the propsed rule,
Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1511-13 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 381 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D.Md. 1974), rev'd in
part and afl'd in part, 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F.Supp.
1382 (D.D.C. 1974), modified, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
78. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (discussing legislative history
of Title VII and 1972 amendments); Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 741-43 (1973).
79. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
80. Id. at 418-25.
The framers of the 1972 amendments to Title VII strongly reaffirmed the "make whole"
purpose of Title VII. The provisions of the sections setting forth remedies under the 1972
amendments
are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the
most complete relief possible. . . . The courts have stressed that the scope of relief under...
the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attain-
ment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employ-
ment practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and
effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (remarks by Sen. Harrison Williams).
81 See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(inadequate interest award "may not have any effect in deterring discrimination or ensuring prompt
implementation of restitutionary orders").
82. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(interest awarded "to reflect the depreciation in the purchasing power of the dollar which has oc-
curred since [plaintiff's] discharge"); Davis v. Jobs for Progress, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 479, 483 (D. Ariz.
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then, interest should to be awarded in Title VII judgments against the
federal government.
1976) ("Prejudgment interest is a proper and allowable component of a back pay award. . . because
the injured worker must be restored to the economic position in which [plaintiff] would have been but
for the discrimination.")
